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In the past decades, risk assessment frameworks have been developed as a viable alternative to
Security-Constrained Dispatch for power grids. Risk-based dispatch can increase power grid
profitability and help better understanding of prominent hazards, however, relevant sources of
uncertainty are often neglected to meet efficiency requirements. In this work, a research effort
towards the development of advanced risk assessment frameworks for power grids is presented.
A surrogate model strategy is proposed and speeds up the post-contingency consequence eval-
uation by analytical sensitivity indices (Line-Outage Distribution Factor). The risk surrogate
model is embedded within a generalized uncertainty quantification framework to evaluate: (1)
The amount of epistemic uncertainty affecting the risk index and attributable to imprecision in
the parameters of the model; (2) The effect aleatory uncertainty in environmental-operational
variables. The surrogate model is tested on the 24 nodes IEEE Reliability Test System. Com-
putational time and accuracy of the results are compared to a high-fidelity AC power flow risk
model. Strengths and weaknesses of the proposed framework highlighted.
Keywords: Power Grid, Risk Assessment, Line-Outage-Distribution-Factors, Surrogate,
Probability Boxes, Sensitivity Analysis
1. Introduction
The goal of a power grid operator is to satisfy the customer’s electric needs in the safest and
most economical way. To guarantee high profitability and operational safety, the grid operator
will schedule an optimal generation profile which minimizes overall production costs and, at the
same time, fulfill a set of security-related constraints [1]. For instance, the scheduled production
will have to comply with the thermal limit of the transmission lines, with the maximum capacity
of the generators and prove to be safe and stable for a predefined list of contingencies (e.g. a set
of N-k failures). This optimization procedure is known as Security Constrained Optimal Power
Flow (SCOPF) or Security Constrained Unit-Commitment, see e.g. [2, 3, 4] or [5]. The power
generation profile obtained from the SCOPF will be safe even after the occurrence of one of the
listed failures.
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SCOPF is a trusted approach, however, it can lead to non-optimal profits, penalizing the
overall economic gain of the network due to its hard constraints on the gird safety. Power grid
safety and revenues are in fact conflicting objectives [6] ard hard security constraints can not
exploit the existing risk-cost trade-off [7]. To overcome this limitation, online risk assessment
frameworks have been developed, providing a viable alternative to security constrained dispatch,
see e.g. [6, 8, 9, 10]. Compared to a SCOPF solution, risk-informed dispatch can lead to a
comparable performance in terms of risks but with higher expected profits. This is due to the
enhanced awareness of relevant operational jeopardies [7, 10]. Risk assessment frameworks are
powerful and versatile tools, although a few limitations have to be addressed. To meet efficiency
requirements simplifying assumptions are generally introduced and there is a tendency to disre-
gard relevant sources of uncertainty which can substantially affect expected risk and profit of the
system (e.g. variability in weather factors, load demand, components availability, etc.).
In this work, we present a computationally efficient risk assessment framework which ac-
counts for relevant sources of uncertainty. A surrogate model strategy, based on linear approx-
imations of sensitivity indices known as Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODF), is used to
reduce the computational cost of each risk evaluations. The surrogate model is embedded within
a generalized Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) framework and tested in performing various UQ
tasks [11]. Mixed sources of uncertainty are taken into account within the framework and their
separate effect quantified in the risk score. Specifically, aleatory uncertainty affecting future
weather conditions and power demand and imprecision (i.e. the epistemic uncertainty) affecting
the probabilistic parameters of the risk model are accounted for. Probability boxes (P-boxes)
are a powerful and versatile tool and are used within the framework to model factors affected
by mixed sources of uncertainty, see e.g. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 11]. Uncertainty propagation
and sensitivity analysis quantify the effect of imprecision and inherent variability on the risk
index. The framework is tested on the 24 nodes IEEE Reliability Test System. Strengths and
weaknesses of the proposed surrogate model are discussed in terms of its accuracy and efficiency
when compared with a high-fidelity risk model based on AC optimal power flow solver. Clas-
sical UQ tasks, i.e. Monte Carlo propagation, and generalized UQ tasks, i.e. P-boxes slicing
propagation and sensitivity analysis, are both performed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the generalized UQ
framework, P-box characterization, propagation, and sensitivity analysis. The severity model
and weather-induced failure morel are presented in Section 3. The proposed surrogate risk model
is presented in Section 4 and is applied to a real-world power grid case study in Section 5 and
results are discussed in Sections 6. Section 7 closes the paper.
2. A generalized framework for uncertainty quantification
Aleatory and epistemic are two different types of uncertainties, sometimes referred to as in-
herent variability and lack of knowledge, respectively [17, 18]. The epistemic uncertainty can be
reduced by further data collection, at least in principle. From an intuitive standpoint, input/output
of analysis for which information is abundant and high in quality will be affected by a mild or
negligible effect of epistemic uncertainty (although this is generally difficult to judge a priori
[13]). In those cases, pure probabilistic methods will be suitable to perform uncertainty quan-





Figure 1: An example of distribution P-box with Gaussian distribution family and imprecise mean and standard deviation.
processes and the propagation of the uncertainty carried out with plain Monte Carlo).
On the other hand, in situations for which data is not abundant, the background knowledge
limited and inherently variable factors are affecting the analysis, both aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties will have a relevant role. In those cases, the use of pure probabilistic approaches
may lead to an underestimation of the uncertainty [13]. The underestimation is attributable to
modeling assumptions needed to characterize the imprecision in a probabilistic framework (e.g.
assume a distribution family or assume a crisp estimation of the distribution’s parameters given
just a few samples). To overcome those limitations, traditional UQ frameworks have been ex-
tended to generalized UQ frameworks, which are capable of handling mixed sources of uncer-
tainty and with less or no need for artificial model assumptions. Some examples of most widely
applied mathematical tools to model quantities affected by mixed aleatory epistemic uncertainties
are: Dempster-Shafer structures (DSS) [19], Fuzzy variables [17], info-gaps [20] and probability
boxes (P-Boxes) [12].
2.1. Probability boxes
Probability Boxes (P-boxes) are powerful mathematical tools to characterize factors affected
by mixed sources of uncertainty. P-boxes have grown in popularity thanks to their versatility
and powerful uncertainty quantification capability [12, 21]. and are used in this work to model
factors affected by mixed aleatory-epistemic uncertainties. P-boxes have been recently applied
for reliability analysis [15], [16], [17], in the context of evidential networks [22], and also for
power grid analysis [13], [14].
A P-box is defined as a pair of CDFs bounding the probability between upper and lower bounds.
Depending on the available background information, the underlying distribution family can be
defined (i.e. distributional/parametric P-box) or only the bounds on the CDF can be available
(i.e. distribution-free P-boxes). An example of Gaussian parametric P-box for which mean µ and
standard deviation σ are imprecisely defined is presented in Fig. 1. P-boxes can be constructed
from data and for further details on the subject the reader is reminded to [12].
Before defining mathematically a P-box, let first recall the definition of cumulative distri-
bution functions (CDFs), which is a non decreasing mapping from R to [0,1] such that for a
probability measure P and for each p ∈ R, the following FP(p) = P((−∞, p]) holds. P-boxes is
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a pair of CDFs [F, F] such that F dominates F in a probabilistic sense. A P-box can be viewed
as a continuous form of random set and defined as follows:
{P ∈ PR|∀x ∈ R, F(x) = P([−∞, x]) ≤ F(x)} (1)
where equation (1) defines the credal set induced by the P-box [F, F].
2.2. Uncertainty propagation for P-boxes
Uncertainty characterized using P-boxes can be propagated to the output of a computational
model y = R(x), for instance, a risk assessment model in this work. For the propagation, several
methods can be used: double loop MC [23], importance sampling method [24], slicing method
[13], multi-level meta-models [16] and, for special classes of problems, analytical methods [25].
In this work, the slicing method is used to propagate P-box uncertainty on the line of previous
works [11].
2.2.1. The slicing method
In slicing method (sometime named focal element propagation method) a total of Ns inde-
pendent ‘alpha-cuts’ are directly obtained from the P-box bounds. An ‘α-cut’, or ‘α-slice’, is
obtained by sampling a value α from a uniform probability distribution U(0, 1) and inverting
lower and upper bounds of the P-box as follows:
FX,i(α)−1 = {x|FX,i(x) = α}, α ∈ [0, 1] (2)
FX,i(α)
−1 = {x|FX,i(x) = α}, α ∈ [0, 1] (3)
The interval [FX,i(α)−1, FX,i(α)
−1] is the support of the focal element for the ith input P-box.
Cartesian product of the input focal elements defines a sample hyper-rectangle (i.e. n-orthotope):
IX,α : [FX1(α1)
−1, FX1(α1)−1] × ... × [FXn(αn)
−1, FXn(αn)−1] (4)
Once a sample support IX,α is obtained, the output bounds can be computed by solving an opti-








where yi and yi are the maximum and minimum output responses associated to the α
th slice,
respectively.
Slices are sampled until a predefined number Nα of hyper-rectangles are samples. Then, upper














To calculate yi and yi, different strategies can be adopted, for instance, the sampling method [13],
the vertex method [26], the interval arithmetic method [27] or a global optimization strategy [28].
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2.3. Sensitivity Analysis for P-boxes
Sensitivity analysis is generally used to investigate the importance of model inputs for an
output of interest. Variance-based sensitivity measures, e.g. Sobol’s indices, have been used to
reveal key inputs driving the output uncertainty. Just a few works have explored sensitivity anal-
ysis in the context of imprecise probability and P-box modeling. R. Schőbi and B. Sudret [29]
investigated global sensitivity analysis using sparse polynomial chaos expansion to reduce the
computational cost of the analysis. S. Ferson and W. T. Tucker [30] explored a novel sensitiv-
ity analysis method by P-box ’pinching’ and convolution. E. Patelli, M. Broggi, M. D. Angelis
and D. A. Alvarez [28] proposed a comparison of 2 sensitivity analysis methods, 1) based on
Hartley-like measure of non-specificity and 2) based on classical global sensitivity analysis by
Sobol indices estimation.
In this paper, we use a generalized sensitivity analysis method, similarly to [30], which uses
“pinching” to estimate the importance of an input P-box one-at-a-time. A P-box can be pinched
in several ways: 1) it can be pinched to a specific CDF (i.e. no epistemic uncertainty involved); 2)
it can be replaced with a precise point-point value (i.e. neither epistemic nor aleatory uncertainty
involved); 3) it can be pinched to an interval with zero variance (i.e. only epistemic uncertainty
involved). Independently from the adopted pinching scheme, the reduced uncertain factor must
be included in the original P-box bounds. Variance-based methods use relative reduction in
variances to quantify the reduction in uncertainty. Analogously, a suitable metric to quantify the
reduction in P-boxes uncertainty has to be selected. The area between the lower and upper output




|FY (y) − FY (y)|dy (8)
where δ measures the level of (epistemic) uncertainty of the output P-box. The metric δ is then
used to quantify the sensitivity of the output to a reduction in uncertainty for the ith input, as
follows:






where δi is the area after pinching the input variable i. The higher the reaction is, the higher the
importance of the input uncertainty [30].
Figure 2 presents graphically the P-box pinching procedure. Two uncertain input x1 and x2
are modelled using a distribution-free P-box and a distributional P-box, respectively. Uncertainty
is propagated to a model output y = f (x) (black solid line in the bottom P-box). Then, the P-box
modelling x2 (top left P-box) is pinched to a specific CDF, which leads to a reduction in un-
certainty (area) for the output P-box (dotted green line). Similarly, the P-box modelling x2 (top
right P-box) is pinched to a crisp point-value and the reduction in area quantified in the output
(dotted marked red line). Accordingly to the method, the sensitivity of y to the factor x2 result
the highest, i.e. it leads to the highest reduction in epistemic uncertainty.
The overall computational costs required to propagate P-box and to perform sensitivity anal-
ysis can be quite high and is mostly affected by time complexity of the min-max mapping in
equations 5-6 and on the computational model R. Develop a computationally efficient surrogate
model specifically fit to replace costly high-fidelity model R is necessary to reduce the computa-
tional burden of these analysis and, at the same time, preserving a good output accuracy.
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Figure 2: Example of sensitivity analysis on model f (x) by pinching input P-boxes on-at-a-time. Two inputs x1 and x2
are pinched to crisp point-value and to a precise CDF, respectively. This induces a different reduction in area for the
output P-box.
3. Power grid probabilistic risk assessment
Generally speaking, the risk is defined as the product of the probability of occurrence of an
event (i.e. contingency) and the related consequences (i.e. severity). In order to account multiple





P(Ei) · S ev(Ei) (10)
where P(Ei) is the probability of occurrence of the undesired event Ei, S ev(Ei) is the severity of
the event when it occurs and n is the number of events considered.
In the context of risk assessment for power grids, a risky event is an unexpected loss of one
(or more) element in the system (e.g. distribution lines, transformers, generators) [8]. Each
event is a so-called contingency and its severity can be measured by analyzing different factors
of interest, for instance, physical quantities which are reflecting the level of stress faced by the
network (e.g. a voltage drop, a frequency deviation from the nominal, excessive flow of power
in the branches, etc. ). In this work, and in line with [10]-[10], the line power flows measures
the overload stress in the system and its closeness to a line thermal violation. The N-1 line
failures are the contingency events considered and the composite risk index R(ζ) for a given







S OL,l(Ci, ζ) (11)
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where NC is the total number of failures in the contingency list, ζ = {L,B, ll,w, λl..} is the set
of structural, environmental and operational factors (e.g. load demand vector L, wind speed w,
line length ll, failure rates lambdal, etc.), Ci is the ith contingency listed, S OL,l is the overload
severity for the line l due to contingency Ci in the condition ζ, P(Ci|ζ) is the probability of facing
Ci given ζ, Nl is the total number of lines in the system.
3.1. A probabilistic model for weather-induced failures
In this work, high wind intensity can induce failures in the power grid by increasing the
occurrence probability of lines tripping. Thus, the grid operational state is affected by ‘normal
weather’ and ‘severe weather’ as in [31]. A model for normal weather conditions describes
weather-independent events, e.g. aging, maintenance, targeted attacks or manufacturing errors
in general. A severe weather model captures failure events which are induced by severe weather
conditions (e.g. wind-induced fatigue, structural failure of the lines due to heavy snow, etc.).
Windy weather is considered here and, for simplicity but without loss of generality, assumed
uniform over the whole system. A wind speed prediction is considered available (e.g. by weather
forecast) but uncertainty is affecting its expected intensity. An error affecting the prediction for









where µw and σw the mean and standard deviation of the prediction error.
High wind increase the grid operative risk, and in Ref. [8] it has been shown a correlation be-
tween the occurrence rate of transmission lines failures and wind intensity (e.g. friction-induced
fatiguing, structure’s joint failures, trees branches falling in the proximity of the line, etc). High
wind speed is assumed to increase the total failure rate λl for a transmission line l as follows [31]:
λl =
{
λl,nom i f w ≥ wcritic
λl,nom + λl,w otherwise
(13)
where λl,nom is the failure rate in [ occkm·h ] during normal weather conditions and λl,w is the contri-






were αw is a regression parameter obtained from failure data in [] and Wcritic is the critical wind
speed assumed to be 8 [m/s]. The failure rate due to a wind event has a strong relation with the
wind intensity, following a quadratic law. It can be observed that for wind speed less or equal to
the critical wind speed (w ≤ wcritic) the wind contribution to the failure rate is null.
In traditional deterministic risk assessment, the impact of each failure is considered but the
likelihood of facing the contingency is not. In probabilistic risk assessment, the probability of
components failure is estimated based on the available information and historical data. The
probability of each contingency takes into account the failure of a distribution line by a Poison









λ j(ζ) · l j) (15)
where P(Cl|ζ) is the probability of line contingency l in the next 1 h, λl is the weather-dependant
failure rate of the distribution line l per unit time and length and ll source is the length of the lth
line. The expression 15 holds if the contingencies list include all the single line failures which
are considered as mutually exclusive events.
3.2. Line overload severity model
A over-load severity function S OL,l is specifically defined for each line in the power grid and
it quantify the extent of a violation on the line (i.e. proximity to the line thermal limit). The line
percentage of rating PRl =
fl
femerg,l
i used to measure how close is the line flow fl to a deterministic
failure threshold, i.e. the emergency rating femerg,l. The S OL,l is defined as follows [10]:
S OL,l(PRl) =
{
d · PRl + c if PRl ≥ PRminl
0, otherwise (16)
where the severity S OL,l is zero for PRl values less than a safety limit PR
sa f e
l =0.9. The determin-
istic limit for the violation of line l is PRl=1, the near violation region is 0.9≤ PRl <1, and the
value PRl under 0.9 is regarded as safe, d=10 and c=-9.
3.3. Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF)
The Direct Current (DC) power flow is a linear approximation of the Alternate Current (AC)
power flow which accounts for just active power, neglecting power loses and reactive power
management [32]. It is often used to alleviate the computational cost of numerically intensive






were Nb is the number of nodes in the network, Pk is the active power injected in the node k,
θi, jand Bi,k are the voltage angle difference and the line susceptance between node i and k, re-
spectively. The equation 17 is obtained under the following DC power flow assumptions of flat
voltage profile (|Vi| = 1 per unit. ∀ nodes i), small voltage angle differences (sin(θi,k) ≈ θi,k) and
negligible resistance (R  X).
The DC power flow equations can be used to select an optimal production profile which
minimizes the production costs for the system. This is commonly referred to as a DC optimal




s.t. g(x) = 0,
h(x) ≤ 0,
xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax.
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where f is a cost function, g is a set of equality constraints (e.g. power balance), h is a set of
inequality constraints (e.g. maximum voltage angles), whereas xmin and xmax define the lower
and upper bounds on the power profile x (i.e. generators capacity), respectively.
3.4. Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs)
The Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) are linear sensitivity measures obtained
under the DC assumption. The PTDFs indicate the incremental change in real power flowing on
transmission lines due to a power transfer between two regions of the grid (e.g. two areas, two
nodes, etc). The matrix of Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs), can be directly derived
from the PTDFs and it quantifies the ratio of change in line active flows conditional to the removal
of transmission lines one-at-a-time. Specifically, each one of its elements dkl quantify the impact
of removing a transmission line k on the active flow in the line l, see [33]-[34]-[35] for further
details. Thus, provided a pre-outage active flow in the line l (fl), it is possible to compute directly
the post-contingency flow after failure of the line k (f kl ) as follows [11]:
f kl = fl + d
k
l fk (18)
were dkl is the element on the l
th row and kth column of the LODF matrix.
In this sense, LODFs can be exploited as a power flow surrogate to approximate post-contingency
flows, line percentages of rating and, finally, overload severity scores. The total overload risk
faced by the system (see Eq.11) can be obtained with a single run of the pre-continency power
flow, with no need to solve additional power flow equations in post-contingency scenarios.
4. The proposed framework based on the post-contingency power-flow surrogate
A computationally cheap risk assessment framework is proposed by exploiting the approxi-
mation capability of the Line Outage Distribution Factors. Algorithm 1 summarizes the proce-
dure for the surrogate risk assessment model proposed in this paper. First, a prediction for the
future environmental-operational conditions (e.g. a forecast) and the grid data are provided in
the vector ζ. Then, a pre-contingency DC optimal power flow is computed to estimate the line
active flows fk in normal operational conditions, PTDFs and LODFs are computed. After the
pre-contingency power flow evaluation, contingency analysis starts by updating the line failure
rates accordingly to the expected wind speed (as described in sections 3.3), probability of fail-
ure computed as in equation 15 and post-contingency flows are directly obtained by using the
Line-Outage Distribution-Factors dkl for the N-1 line failures as in equation 18. Finally, overload
severity for each line and each contingency is obtained and composite overload risk index com-
puted as in equations 16 and 11, respectively.
The efficient risk assessment model is embedded within the generalized framework for un-
certainty quantification as presented in Section 2. The framework can be utilized to perform
classical uncertainty quantification tasks (e.g. Monte Carlo aleatory uncertainty propagation,
correlation analysis, sensitivity analysis, etc.) or generalized uncertainty quantification tasks.
For instance, the slicing algorithm can be used to evaluate the effect on the overall risk index
R(ζ) of the imprecision affecting in the input parameters ζ. The procedure for P-boxes propaga-




Input the number of α slices (Nα), GA starting population (pop), maximum number of
generations (epoch) and number of imprecise input variables Ni.
Slicing:
1. Extract randomly α = (α1, α2, ..., αNi ) where αi ∼ U(0, 1), i = 1..,Ni. Invert P-boxes and
obtain the hyper-rectangle IX,α as in equation 4.
2. Start minimization and maximization with GA. Randomize initial population pop con-
strained within IX,α. Evaluate population fitness R(ζ), perform selection, crossover, muta-
tion to produce offspring chromosomes. Evaluate offspring fitness function and repeat in
evolutionary procedure until epoch is reached.
3. Save the resulting [R(ζ),R(ζ)]α providing output bounds for the first α-slice. Repeat steps
1,2 and 3 are repeated until Nα slices are evaluated.
4. The intervals [R(ζ),R(ζ)]1, [R(ζ),R(ζ)]2,...,[R(ζ),R(ζ)]Nα are used to construct the risk P-
box.
Algorithm 1 Risk Assessment Model
1: procedure R(x) (Risk Assessment based on LODF)
2: Input weather-operative conditions ζ = {L,B, ll,w, λl..}
3: Run pre-contingency DC-OPF, obtain line flows fk ∀ lines k
4: Compute PTDF and Line Outage Distribution Factors dkl
5: for each single-line contingency Cl do
6: Update line failure rate λl(w)
7: Compute P(Cl|ζ)
8: Compute post-contingency flows f kl = fl + d
k
l fk
9: Compute percentage of rating PRl =
fl
femerg,l













Algorithm 2 P-box Slicing Algorithm
1: procedure Slicing Method
2: Set Nα, GA pop epoch and epistemic space dimension Ni
3: for k = 1 to Nα do
4: Randomize α = (α1, α2, ..., αNi ) where αi ∼ U(0, 1) ∀ i = 1, ..,Ni
5: for i = 1 to Ni do
6: Invert P-box and construct focal element [FX,i(αi)−1, FX,i(αi)
−1]
7: end for




−1, FXNi (αNi )
−1]
9: Solve constrained min-max problem with GA: R(ζ) = max
x∈IX,k




11: Compute R(ζ) bounds on the CDF and calculate P-box area δ
12: end procedure
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Figure 3: The IEEE 24 nodes reliability test system [36].
5. Case Study
A modified version of the IEEE reliability test system [7] is used to test the framework. Figure
3 depicts the network architecture, the 38 lines connecting the 24 nodes, the main generating
units, the transformers and the locations of the 17 load nodes (the nodes with arrows in figure).
Table 1 presents the estimated values of the line failure rates λl expressed in [ occurrenceh ]. Table
2 shows the connectivity structure of the lines and corresponding identification number (ID).
Additional details such as design peak loads, lines susceptances or lines thermal rating are not
reported here, for sake of synthesis. The reader is reminded to [36] or [7] for a full display of the
network data.
5.1. Characterization of Uncertainty
The considered uncertain input are the 17 load demands (Li) in each demand node i, the 38
failure rates of the lines λ and the wind speed prediction w assumed to be uniform over the gird
area. For each line, the estimator of the failure rate λl is assumed to be affected by pure epistemic
11
ID λl ID λl ID λl
1 0.0274 14 0.0023 27 0.0468
2 0.0582 15 0.0023 28 0.3801
3 0.0377 16 0.0023 29 0.0388
4 0.0445 17 0.0023 30 0.0365
5 0.0548 18 0.0457 31 0.0616
6 0.0434 19 0.0445 32 0.0400
7 0.0023 20 0.0457 33 0.0400
8 0.0411 21 0.0594 34 0.0434
9 0.0388 22 0.0559 35 0.0434
10 0.0377 23 0.0434 36 0.0388
11 0.0342 24 0.3801 37 0.0388
12 0.0502 25 0.0468 38 0.0514
13 0.0502 26 0.0468 - -
Table 1: The lines Failure rates
ID i − j ID i − j ID i − j
1 1 − 2 14 9 − 11 27 15 − 24
2 1 − 3 15 9 − 12 28 16 − 17
3 1 − 5 16 10 − 11 29 16 − 19
4 2 − 4 17 10 − 12 30 17 − 18
5 2 − 6 18 11 − 13 31 17 − 22
6 3 − 9 19 11 − 14 32 18 − 21
7 3 − 24 20 12 − 13 33 18 − 21
8 4 − 9 21 12 − 23 34 19 − 20
9 5 − 10 22 13 − 23 35 19 − 20
10 6 − 10 23 14 − 16 36 20 − 23
11 7 − 8 24 15 − 16 37 20 − 23
12 8 − 9 25 15 − 21 38 21 − 22
13 9 − 10 26 15 − 21 - -
Table 2: The lines identification numbers (ID) and nodes
connectity (line connecting node i to node j)
uncertainty. This is a typical situation for reliable components for which only a few failure data
(or no data at all) is available for the statistical analysis. Failure rates are assumed to lay within
an interval [λl,λl], where the upper and lower bounds are known to be equal to ±2% of the values
presented in Table 1.
The loads naturally change in time (e.g. from day to night or from winter to summer time)
and, commonly, a large volume of data is available to build probabilistic models, i.e. historical
time series collected over several years. However, due to recent trends in the power grid sector
(e.g. allocation of renewable sources, distributed generators, etc.), the reliability of probabilistic
models describing the load variability is likely to decrease. Thus, the loads are considered af-
fected by both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty (e.g. due to a lack of knowledge on the effect
of new technological developments) and P-boxes used to model this uncertainty. The family of
the parent distribution is assumed to be Gaussian and imprecision affect the mean and standard
deviation. For each load, the mean value µ(Li) of the load distribution is assumed to be ± 2% of
a design peak load, presented in [36]. Similarly, the standard deviations are assumed to be im-
precisely defined within the intervals [σ(Li),σ(Li)]=[0.05µ(Li), 0.05µ(Li)], i = 1, .., 17. Finally,
a prediction for the wind speed is considered and assumed to be normally distributed with µw =6
and σw =1, respectively. Imprecision is assumed affecting µw which lays within the ± 10% error
interval [5.4,6.6].
6. Results and discussion
6.1. Comparison between the risk surrogate and an high-fidelity AC-OPF risk model
In order to verify the proposed risk assessment surrogate and assess its effectiveness in
performing classical uncertainty quantification analysis, we compare its results against a high-
fidelity model. The high-fidelity risk assessment model is based on AC-OPF, as proposed in [14].
The contingency list includes all the N-1 line failures and the consequences of a line failure are
assessed by solving AC-Power Flow in a contingency state [37]. Specifically for the proposed
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Figure 4: The R(ζ) PDFs using the proposed risk model surrogate and the AC-OPF model.
case study, a single high-fidelity risk calculation requires 1 AC-OPF (pre-contingency dispatch)
and 38 AC power flows (post-contingency consequence evaluation), for an indicative wall-clock
time of 3.8 second. Although this may seems a relatively small computational cost for determin-
istic analysis, it can be quite intensive for UQ tasks. Computational cost which can result even
prohibitive when generalized UQ method are adopted (e.g. P-box sensitivity and propagation).
The proposed surrogate requires just a single DC-OPF run (pre-contingency dispatch) and post-
contingency scenario are approximated by using LODF. It requires approximately 0.09 seconds
to obtain R(ζ) (on a standard 2-cores, 4.0 Gb RAM, 1.7 GHz processor machine).
Monte Carlo analysis has been used to propagate the aleatory uncertainty in the loads and
the wind speed. In compliance with the aims of this verification analysis, it has been assumed
no epistemic uncertainty is affecting the parameters of the probabilistic model, thus performing
classical UQ. Figure 4 presents the resulting PDFs, obtained by using 1500 independent samples
from the aleatory uncertain variables. It can be observed that surrogate and high-fidelity models
provide quite similar results. This points out a good approximation capability of the proposed
surrogate. On the other hand, our surrogate slightly overestimate the upper tail of the risk dis-
tribution. Although it is conservative from a risk prospective, this can be seen as a limitation
of the proposed model, which is incapable of fully capture all the relevant grid behaviors. For
instance, highly non-linear conditions for which the validity of the DC assumptions slacken.
Nonetheless, it provides a fairly good approximation of the R(ζ) PDF moments (µ =0.0192 and
µ =0.0014) when compared to the AC-OPF results (µ =0.0184 and σ=0.001). Moreover, our
surrogate greatly reduces the computational cost of the UQ analysis, up to a 98% reduction. In
fact, for the 1500 MC samples, it provides the solution in about 145 seconds, substantially less
than the 6200 seconds needed to solve the high-fidelity model (on a 2-cores, 4.0 Gb RAM, 1.7
GHz processor machine).
In order to better explore the goodness of the surrogate. correlation analysis is also pro-
posed. Specifically, the Persons’ correlation coefficients linking R(ζ) to the 17 loads have been
estimated and graphically presented in Figure 5. It can be observed a good agreement between
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Figure 5: Persons’ correlation coefficients between R(ζ) and loads for the proposed risk surrogate and the AC-OPF
model.
the input-output correlations of the two models. Both identify a positive correlation between the
overload risk and the loads in the southern part of the grid, i.e. nodes from 1-10 (with a little
discrepancy in node 9). A negative correlation has been observed with the load in node 18, which
indicates a reduction in the overload in post-contingency risk for increasing demand in node 18.
This result is in good agreement with previous analysis [38] and can be explained by looking
at the generators production profile. Generators in the upper part of the grid (e.g. generators in
nodes 13, 15, 18) are associated with lower generation costs. This lead to the maximum exploita-
tion of their production capacity, independently from the load profile realization. Consequently,
when electrical power is demanded (and consumed) locally, less power will be flowing from the
northern area to the southern area of the network, thus reducing the risk of facing more severe
post-contingency overflow scenarios.
6.2. Imprecise probabilistic analysis
After verification of the proposed model in performing classical UQ analysis, the risk sur-
rogate model has been adopted to perform a generalized uncertainty analysis on the system, i.e.
accounting for both sources of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty and discerning between the ef-
fect of the two. Probability boxes have been used to characterize the uncertainty affecting loads,
wind speed and failure rate as described in...
6.2.1. Slicing method
The slicing algorithm 2 has been used to propagate P-box uncertainty to the risk index. Two
independent slicing propagation analyses have been performed adopting 20 and 100 slices re-
spectively. Genetic algorithm optimizer has been adopted as described in [11] to approximate
the minimum and maximum risk in each sampled hyper-rectangle. The Genetic Algorithm pa-
rameters have been tuned empirically. It has been observed that for a starting population of just
10 individuals and for about 100 iterations the risk index results close to convergence. Hence,




Figure 6: Comparison between the CDF obtained considering only aleatory uncertainty (black solid line) and P-boxes
obtained for 20 slices (blue dotted lines) and 100 slices (red dashed lines).
Figure 6 shows the generalized uncertainty quantification results for the overload risk in-
dex. Two P-boxes have been displayed, resulting from Nα =20 (blue dotted lines) and Nα =100
slices (red dashed lines), respectively. AS expected, the bounds obtained using the generalized
uncertainty method include the classical result (black solid line CDF) and, when compared, gen-
eralized UQ shows a possible underestimation of the risk if imprecision is not accounted for.
To clarify the idea consider a case where the system operator decides for a maximum allowed
overload risk of 0.023. Adopting a classical UQ approach, the probability of meeting this re-
quirement is approximately 0.99 (i.e. due to inherent variability in the environmental-operational
conditions, 1% of the possible scenarios have an unacceptable risk). Conversely, accounting for
imprecision, the likelihood of fulfilling the requirement can be anywhere between 1 and about
0.7. This means that between 30% and 0% of possible scenarios do not comply with the risk
requirement (due to epistemic uncertainty). Thus for this example, the worst case scenario for
classical UQ results (1%) strongly underestimate the true worst-case scenario obtained by gen-
eralized UQ (30 %).
The risk P-box area from Nα =100 slices is estimated to be δ =0.0057. To investigate further
this results, 10 independent slicing algorithm have been run with the same setup and error on
the δ results analysed. The average error in area resulted approximately 4.7% and it is likely
due to an early convergence of the GA optimization (truncated at 100 epochs). Nonetheless, this
error margin was considered acceptably low and the estimate precise enough to carry on with
sensitivity analysis.
6.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis on the epistemic space has been performed by pinching each load Li to
the mean empirical CDF (average between upper and lower P-box bounds). Similarly, line fail-
ure rates have been pinched to a reduced interval (i.e. an improved estimator, from the initial
±2% to a ±1% of the estimated λl). The reduced epistemic space has been propagated through
the risk model by the slicing method (Algorithm2) and setting Nα =50, Ni =55 (i.e. 17 Li and 38
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λl) and GA pop=10 and epoch=50.
It is worth remarking that P-box sensitivity can be very intensive computationally speaking,
i.e. the computational complexity is equal to Ni times the already high cost of the slicing meth-
ods. Thus, a high-performance computing strategy has been designed to forward each α-slice to
a core of a 8-cores computers cluster. Thanks to the efficient risk assessment framework, Algo-
rithm 1, the overall computational time for the analysis was about 13.3 hours. The same analysis
would have been infeasible using the high-fidelity model (indicatively 20 days). Figure 7 shows
the effect on the R(ζ) P-box bounds when pinching the loads and Table 3 displays ranking results
based on their sensitivity score S i (i.e. P-box area reduction as in equation 9).
Table 3: Ranks of the load imprecision with respect to S i.
Load ID S i rank Load ID S i rank
L18 25.8% 1 L16 8.5% 10
L19 20.2% 2 L5 7.9% 11
L3 13.9% 3 L7 7.1% 12
L14 13.6% 4 L10 6.4% 13
L15 11.8% 5 L4 6.1% 14
L20 11.7% 6 L6 6% 15
L13 10.8% 7 L9 5% 16




Figure 7: Risk probability bounds before and after pinching the 17 loads. For each α level, the input load is pinched to
the mean between upper and lower bounds.
The sensitivity analysis points out that the uncertainty affecting load in node 18 has the
largest contribution to the risk of epistemic uncertainty. This is in accordance with previous
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analysis [11]. Similarly, the epistemic uncertainty affecting the loads at node 19, 3 and 14 has
also a sensible effect on the risk imprecision. By reducing the uncertainty in the load 18 (i.e. by
pinching) an area reduction of 25.8% has been observed for the risk P-box. Pinching the loads 19,
3 and 14 lead to a 20.2%, 13.9% and 13.5% reduction, respectively. This is a piece of important
information which is exploitable for future collection of data or uncertainty reduction schemes.
For instance, it can be advised: 1) A better monitoring of the load 18 and 19; 2) a dedicated
control policy leading to a reduction in the load uncertainty in 18 (e.g. by peak shaving or by
load curtailment ). For what concerns the other imprecise factors considered in this analysis (the
other loads and the failure rates), their contributions to the reduction in the area seems to be less
relevant, i.e. a reduction between 1% and 10 %, and are not reported here.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a power grid probabilistic risk assessment framework has been introduced and
a surrogated model proposed for generalized uncertainty quantification. The surrogate model
is used to speed up time-costly risk calculations and is embedded within a generalized frame-
work for aleatory-epistemic uncertainty propagation and sensitivity analysis. Its accuracy and
computational cost are tested against a high-fidelity risk model based on the AC power flow
method and accounting for the N-1 single line failures. The surrogate model results are com-
parable in accuracy but with a great reduction in the computational cost of the analysis, up to
a 97 % reduction. Probability boxes are used to characterize the uncertainty in the gird power
loads, environmental factors, and components availability. The Slicing method and sensitivity
by pinching are proposed to analyze the effect of mixed aleatory-epistemic uncertainties on the
output of the surrogate model. Two of the loads have been identified as key epistemic uncertain
factors which are preventing the most from a crisp calculation of the system risk score. The
proposed framework is a valuable tool which enables the examiners to efficiently (thanks to the
surrogate model) analyze the extent of reducible and irreducible uncertainty on the grid risk. Fur-
thermore, the framework can be used to identify key sources of lack of information and inherent
variability to be identified. This is valuable information which can be used to 1) design smarter
data collection schemes, 2) perform uncertainty reduction to provide less uncertain risk score,
3) ]design enhanced online risk assessment models and design better operational policies with
greater awareness of associated risks.
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